

## Republic Bk IV 427d–445e<sup>1</sup>

In this part, Socrates locates morality and justice in the ideal city. He associates the four cardinal virtues with different classes or parts of society, and then translates the discussion to the soul. Here is the roadmap:

<i>Virtues</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Soul</i>
wisdom	428b–429a	442c
courage	429a–430c	442b–c
self-discipline	430d–432b	442c–d
justice/morality	432b–434c	441d–442a, 442d

1. How does Socrates plan to find justice/morality in the state? What do you make of this strategy? (428a)
2. Briefly sketch the four virtues of the ideal state.
- 3.★ How is self-discipline characterised? (430d–432a)
4. What is the parallel between the classes in society and the soul? (435b–c)
- 5.★ Socrates grounds the partition of the soul in something like an opposition principle. What is this and how do the associated examples work? (436b–437d; cf. 439b)
6. What is justice in the state, and what is justice in the soul? (433a–434c; 441d–442d)
- 7.★ “Goodness [Ἀρετὴ], then, is apparently a state of mental health [ὑγεία ψυχῆς], bloom and vitality” (444d). How does Socrates argue for this? (443b–444d)

*Background.* (a) The four virtues are: *sophia* (σοφία), which relates to the virtues of the mind or of reason, such as intelligence or understanding; *andreia* (ἀνδρεία), which means to have guts and spirit; but is closely associated with being a man (*andros*), thus ‘manliness’ would be a literal translation; *sophrosyne* (σωφροσύνη), which is often also translated as temperance, prudence, or moderation, because the Greek term means ‘good sense’, which links to being level-headed or composed; and *dikaiosyne* (δικαιοσύνη). (b) At 435c, Socrates talks of *features* of the mind. The Greek εἶδη (*eide*, sing. *eidos*) can also mean constituent or element. It is associated with *idea* or *form*, which we will encounter later (end of Bk V to beginning of Bk VII). (c) The three parts of the soul (439d–e, 441a): reason (λογιστικόν, *logistikon*), spirit (θυμοειδές, *thymoeides*), and desire or appetite (ἐπιθυμητικόν, *epithymetikon*). (d) At the end of Bk IV, when taking up the discussion about the rewards of justice, Socrates is about to associate types of goodness to different types of political systems. But he only returns to this matter in Bk VIII (543ff.), after a long detour.

<sup>1</sup> Ch. 6 in the Waterfield translation.