


## A Map of Theaetetus



1. Pages of the Stephanus edition of 1578: the standard pagination of Plato's works.

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2. The page numbers of the Oxford World Classics edition.

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↓ 3. A rough outline of the contents.

### I. INTRODUCTION

142a–143c	3–5	Conversation that frames the main dialogue: Eucleides and Terpsion. Historic date: shortly before Theaetetus's death probably in 369 BCE.
143d–145c	5–8	The characters introduced: Theodorus, Theaetetus, Socrates. Dramatic date: 399 BCE, when Theaetetus was a teenager.
145c–146c	8–9	The central question posed: what is knowledge (τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη, <i>to soi dokei einai epistēmē</i> )?
146c–148e	9–13	Theaetetus initial answer (D0); the central question clarified: what is knowledge 'as such', or 'itself' (γινῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ, <i>gnonai epistēmē auto</i> ).
149a–151d	13–7	Socrates's midwifery (ἡ μαιευτικὴ τέχνη, <i>he maieutikē technē</i> ).

### II. FIRST DEFINITION (D1)

151d–e	17	D1: knowledge is perception (οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις, <i>ouk allo ti estin epistēmē hē aisthēsis</i> ).
152a–c	17–8	Thesis P (Protagoras): man is the measure of all things.
152c–157d	18–26	Thesis H (Heraclitus): flux, things are always coming to be.
157e–160e	26–32	An initial objection: dream and sleep; confirmation that D1, P and H coincide.
161a–163a	32–5	First critical attempt, and brief reply by 'Protagoras'.
163a–164c	35–7	Second criticism: hear language one does not know; remembering and not knowing.
164c–165e	37–40	Socrates doubts the plausibility of his criticism ( <i>ἀντιλογικῶς</i> , <i>antilogikos</i> = 'in a logic-chopping way').
165e–168c	40–3	Socrates defends the theses on behalf of Protagoras: impossible to judge what it not (i.e. what is false), impossible to judge beyond what one perceives.
168d–171d	44–8	Theodorus enters the dialogue; third criticism: generalised, if others judge that P is false, yet Protagoras

		presumes all judgements are true, then he concedes that ‘P is false’ is true, and hence that P is false. Self-refutation?
171e–172b	48–9	Beginning a fourth objection.
172c–177c	49–56	Digression on the philosopher.
177c–179d	56–60	Completing the fourth objection: better judgements, expertise, more ‘doxastic’ authority; not everyone is a ‘measure’ (some are more ‘measure’ than others). Yet: concession that D1 is perhaps accurate for <i>present</i> things.
179d–184b	60–7	Criticism of H: generalised, extreme flux.
184b–186e	67–71	Final refutation of D1: being is not perceived, but can be known, and thus knowledge is not perception.

### III. SECOND DEFINITION (D2)

187a–c	71–2	D2: knowledge is true judgement ( <i>ἡ ἀληθῆς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, hē alēthēs doxa epistēmē einai</i> ).
187d–e	72–3	Introducing problems with false judgements: how possible?
187e–188c	73–4	(a) Thinking a thing that is another thing.
188d–189b	74–5	(b) Thinking a thing that is not.
189b–190e	75–8	(c) ‘Other-judging’ ( <i>ἀλλοδοξεῖν, allodoxein</i> )
191a–196c	78–87	(d) The mind as a wax tablet: error concerns judging, not perceiving.
196d–200d	87–93	(e) The mind as an aviary: having/possession knowledge; solving puzzles about false judgement seems to presuppose the definition of knowledge.
200d–201c	93–4	Refutation of D2: persuasion and testimony; true judgement and knowledge may come apart, and are thus not the same.

### IV. THIRD DEFINITION (D3)

201c–206c	95–103	D3: knowledge is true judgement with an ‘account’ or <i>logos</i> ( <i>τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, tēn mēn meta logou alēthē doxan epistēmēn einai</i> ). Socrates’s dream about elements and complexes introduced and then refuted.
206c–e	103	What is an ‘account’? (a) <i>Logos</i> as making a statement.
206e–208b	103–6	(b) <i>Logos</i> as enumerating elements or parts.
208c–210a	106–9	(c) <i>Logos</i> as providing a distinctive or differentiating feature.
210b–d	109–10	D3 refuted. <i>Aporia</i> : all attempts to define knowledge fail. At the end, Socrates refers to his trial (cf. <i>Apology</i> ), and hints at both <i>Euthyphro</i> (which is set at the King’s Porch) and the <i>Sophist</i> , whose dramatic date is the next day.

