

## Reading the Second Section

*Introductory Remark.* This is the longest section of *GMS* (40pp. in *AA*). Thus the questions do not cover the entire text. If there is an aspect in the *GMS* II that you would like to explore in more detail, you could consider writing an essay instead. Remember, (a) for credit you need to produce about 2,000 words of text; (b) you can pick and mix your answers from all coursework sheets; (c) questions marked with asterisks (\*) are more demanding or time-consuming.

1. A visualisation task. The length of each paragraph in *GMS* II is indicated on Handout 6 ('Groundwork Section II') as a bar. Make use of this bar. (a) You could colour code it, similar to the task for the Preface, according to its accessibility or readability. Instead of colouring, you could just rate it in numbers between 0 and 3, say. (b) Or you could colour code it with regard to the relevance of the paragraph to the overall line of thought. (In this way, you make connections between the parts of the section.) (c) Alternatively, you could colour code paragraphs that appear to have the same key terms (e.g., colour the bar in blue, say, if *will* appears often in your view; and likewise for other terms of your informed choice and in different colours). (In this way, a sort of a heat-map of *GMS* II emerges.) (d) Perhaps you have further ideas for using the paragraph bars of the overview.
2. In the opening ten paragraphs (406.5–412.14), Kant gives us a range of reasons for *not* trying to ground morality in experience. Make a list of these reasons, and rank them with regard to how plausible you find them.
- 3.\* What is Kant's aim in *GMS* II? (412.15–25)
- 4.\* Why is the will 'nothing other than practical reason'? (412.26–413.8) You might want to consider 459.11 too, where Kant gives another definition of the will.
5. What is an imperative, and what does it do? (413.9–414.11)
6. Explain and illustrate the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. (414.12–415.5)
- 7.\* Overlooking ¶¶ 19–23, make a list or a table that covers the imperatives of skill, prudence, and morality, and relates them to rules, counsels, and laws (esp. 416.19–20), as well as principles that are problematic, assertoric, and apodictic. (414.32–417.2)
- 8.\* Imperatives of skill and prudence are possible because they are analytical. But why are they analytical? (417.2–420.17)
9. Select one of Kant's examples and explain how the CI works. (421.6–424.14)
10. From 427.19 to 429.13, Kant derives a new formula for the CI, *viz.* the formula of humanity (FH). Sketch how this derivation works.
11. Analyse one or two of Kant's examples with FH in mind. (429.15–430.27)
12. At 431.15, Kant suggests a third formula for the CI. Identify and briefly explain it. (430.28–432.24)
13. What is the difference between autonomy and heteronomy? (433.9–11)

14. What is a ‘kingdom of ends’, and how does Kant use this ‘very fruitful concept’? (433.12–434.20; see also 438.8–439.34)
15. ‘*Autonomy* is thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational nature’ (436.6–7). Explicate this passage, and provide some context. (434.31–436.7)
16. Returning to the beginning of *GMS* I (393), Kant tells us again what the good will is. What is the connection to the categorical imperative? (437.5–438.7)
- 17.\* Sketch the paradox that Kant mentions at 439.4, and briefly explain how he solves it. (438.8–440.13)
18. What is the ‘supreme principle of morality’? (440.15–32)
19. What is the heteronomy of the will, and what is the problem with this? (441.1–444.27)

*Background Information.* (a) A proposition is *analytic* if a conceptual analysis of the subject term yields the predicate term. E.g., ‘bodies are extended’: that  $x$  is extended is already contained in  $x$ ’s being a body. It is part of the concept of a body that it is extended. For Kant, analytical propositions are *a priori*, i.e. independent of experience. But some *a priori* propositions are *synthetic* (420.14, see also 417.16–21). This means that such statements contain a predicate term that tells us *more* than the subject term, and they are thus ‘ampliative’ (cf. *Prolegomena* 4:266); yet our cognition or grasp of them does not depend on, and is not derived from, experience. Given that he relates pure will and action *a priori*, (this is the whole point of *GMS* so far as a *metaphysics* of morals!), yet the concept of an acting cannot be teased out of that of a will, Kant concludes that the moral law is a synthetic *a priori* proposition (420.14, see also Note). He promises to deal with this in *GMS* III. (b) *Rules* concern means; *maxims* connect particular means to particular ends (cf. the discussion of hypothetical imperatives on 415ff.). (c) The section titles that begin to appear on 4:440 are Kant’s own.

