

GMS III: Proving that the CI is Possible

1. Organisation

§1. *Freedom explains the will's autonomy.* The capacity of a rational will to give itself moral laws is freedom.





§2. *Freedom must be presupposed.* Free rational beings *do* act (are practical).

§3. *Interest.* How *can* the will be determined to act other than by natural inclination? There must be an interest in the law. A circle (9–16): we consider ourselves free because we think of ourselves as subject to moral law; and we think ourselves as subject to moral law because we consider ourselves free. The worlds of Sense and Understanding.

§4. *The possibility of the CI.* The will straddles the two worlds, yet the idea of pure will belongs to the intelligible world.

§5. *The limits of practical philosophy.* Dialectical tensions between freedom and natural necessity. But this tension is a transcendental illusion, and thus does not affect practical philosophy (20–4). Free will cannot be cognised or explained (25–9). The limit of practical philosophy: it is inexplicable how interest in morality without natural inclinations is possible (30–4).

§6. *Concluding Remark.* We comprehend that the unconditional necessity of the CI is incomprehensible.



Note. Each numbered block represents a paragraph; the sizes are proportional.

2. The Frequency of selected Key Terms plotted against AA pages

