From D1 to D2

1. D1 fails: “Knowledge is something other than perception” (186e).
2. Knowledge is not located in our experiences, but in our reasoning (συλλογισμῷ, συλλογισμῶ) about what is common between these experiences (cf. 186d). Knowledge is not perception, but it may well be judging about perceptions, or about immediate perceptual awareness. Alternatively, to know is to have true beliefs about perceptions (perceptual beliefs) as a result of judging (δοξαζέων, δοξαζείν).
3. Knowledge can thus be found in what the mind is doing when it occupies itself with the things that are (τα οντα, τα ὄντα).
4. Remember: perception too is of what is, or what exists (152c).
5. Knowledge has a cognitive component.
6. Socrates calls it doxazéin—a verb: to judge, to form opinions (doxa). We could also say to believe something. [Note: a judgement is not a belief in this sense, as ‘belief’ lacks the procedural or episodic aspects associated with it: we have beliefs; but judging is ‘speaking to oneself’ (190c: λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξαζέιν ἐστίν). Hence a belief is perhaps the outcome of such a process, which can be expresses in a judgement.]
7. D2: knowledge is true judgement (187b). Knowledge thus has a semantic component too.
8. Strategy. (a) At 150b–c, Socrates suggests that the greatest achievement of midwifery is to discriminate between truth and falsity. This is pivotal to distinguish sophistry or rhetoric from dialectic. (b) One of the key features of the man-measure doctrine (P) is that nobody is wrong about their experiences, and false judgment is impossible. This is part of what the long discussion of D1 aims to expose.
9. But plainly: there is false judgement and error.
10. In support of D2, we must show how false and true judgement is possible. In order to understand true judgement, we need to understand how it differs from false judgement, and hence we need to understand what false judgement is.
12. Ignoring learning and forgetting (188a), for anything, we either know it or do not know it. So, every judgment we make is about something we know or something we do not know. [Note: the word for ‘know’ in this context is eidenai (εἰδέναι), which is perhaps more like the French connaître or the German kennen: knowledge by acquaintance; as when we say that we ‘know’ Paris. Plato hence does not beg the question.]
13. Strategy. The critical focus remains on empiricism, i.e. the idea that knowledge ultimately grounds in sensory perception. So, with D2 at stake, empiricists need to show how false judgement is possible. But over the following five attempts they cannot solve the puzzles. D2 fails.
1. Misidentification (188a–c)

Example: someone mistakes elms for beeches, or judges an elm to be a beech. Number the cases mentioned in the passage. What is Theaetetus’ verdict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S knows beeches</th>
<th>S does not know beeches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S knows elms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S does not know elms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Believing what is not (188c–189b)

Fill in the gaps of this argument.

(1) If we perceive something, then __________________________________________

(2) Likewise, if we make a judgement, we have in mind ____________________________

(3) ____________________________________________,

then we judge about no one thing.

(4) If we judge about nothing, then ____________________________________________

(5) It is impossible to make any judgement about ____________________________

(6) False judgement is something other than having in one’s judgement the things which are not (189b).

Corollary. It is neither a judgement about things that are, for we do not err about these. So, what could it be that false judgement is about?

3. Other-Judging: Allodoxia (189b–191a)

Upshot. To judge falsely is to have in mind two things that are and to believe they are one (that one is the other); or to have in mind one thing and to believe it is different from what is not in the mind. This is impossible. Allodoxia in this sense cannot work. (For alternative hint, see 189c, and Sophist 263.)